Reorganizing Gender-Specific Persecution:  A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category by Stevens, Mattie L.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 3
Issue 1 Fall 1993 Article 7
Reorganizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A
Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee
Category
Mattie L. Stevens
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stevens, Mattie L. (1993) "Reorganizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category,"
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol3/iss1/7
RECOGNIZING GENDER-SPECIFIC
PERSECUTION: A PROPOSAL TO ADD GENDER
AS A SIXTH REFUGEE CATEGORY
INTRODUCTION
United States law currently defines a "refugee" as a person
who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
the basis of one or more of five grounds: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.1 Although it is a "valuable starting point for developing
a more coherent policy to deal with this worldwide problem,"2
the current definition is merely a beginning. It fails to
acknowledge the violence and discrimination aimed specifically
at women.
This Article suggests that the United States now needs a
sixth refugee category - gender. Only a new category can
ensure that the refugee definition will cover harms specific to
women - like female genital mutilation, rape, and gender-
based discrimination - and will recognize these harms as
persecution. Moreover, adding gender as a sixth category is
consistent with both the evolution of the definition and the
United States' historic concern for refugees.
Part I of this Article examines the current United States
refugee definition by first considering its history and then
discussing its elements. Part H discusses the treatment of
gender-specific persecution claims both in the United States
and abroad. Part III exposes the shortcomings of the current
United States refugee definition by examining attempts to apply
the definition to gender-specific persecution. Part IV advocates
adding gender as a sixth category, because it is the only viable
remedy to the inequities in the United States' current refugee
definition.
'8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42) (1988).
2 Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings on the Refugee
Act of 1979J (statement of Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, one of the
sponsors of the Refugee Act).
' Gender-specific persecution denotes persecution based on the sex of the
victim, or persecution visited upon women because of their sex and/or
physiological vulnerability to a specific type of harm.
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I. THE CURRENT UNITED STATES REFUGEE
DEFINITION AND ITS ORIGINS
An analysis of current refugee law should begin with the
history of the United States' attitudes towards immigration.
The United States is a country of immigrants, most of whom
historically have been European.4  The United States
traditionally has shown sympathy for independence movements
and political refugees, reflecting the revolutionary genesis of the
nation itself.5 Yet, there is also a history of patriarchy and
gender-based ideals concerning the definition of refugees.'
These historic conceptions affect current refugee law in the
United States by creating formal, legal, and procedural hurdles
as well as informal perceptions and assumptions.
A. HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
The Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), when first
enacted in 1952, neither provided for, nor even mentioned,
4 Among the first U.S. citizens were "the descendants of the Huguenots,
Palatines, and other refugees from Europe." EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: 1798-1965, at 521
(1981).
' Id. For example, see section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1875, which
excluded criminals, but not those having engaged in political offenses. This
Act, the first to exclude criminals, defined the excludable class as "persons who
are undergoing a sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious
crimes other than political or growing out of or the result of such political
offenses." Immigration Act of March 3, 1875, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (1875), amended
by Immigration Act of August 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (1882).
Section 4 of the 1882 Act provided that "all foreign convicts, except those
convicted of political offenses, upon arrival shall be sent back." Immigration
Act of August 3, 1882, § 4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882), repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554,
§ 8, 80 Stat. 378, 634 (1967).
The Immigration Act of March 3, 1891 was even more explicit. Section
1 provided
[t]hat nothing in this act shall be construed to apply to or exclude
persons convicted of a political offense, notwithstanding said
political offense may be designated as a "felony, crime, infamous
crime, or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude" by the laws of
the land whence he came or by the court convicting.
Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, §1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8, 80 Stat. 378, 636 (1967).
'See generally Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) (discussing feminist views of
international law's treatment of women).
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refugees.' However, in 1953, Congress passed the Refugee
Relief Act to deal specifically with the problem of European
refugees.8
The INA itself did not address the global problem of
refugees at all until 1957. Section 7 of the 1957 amendment to
the INA provided that an alien who otherwise could be deported
for having obtained or attempted to obtain an immigration visa
by fraud or misrepresentation, or having misrepresented
personal information on a visa application, could still remain in
the United States if he or she could show that9
the misrepresentation was predicated upon the alien's
fear of persecution because of race, religion, or political
opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence,
and was not committed for the purpose of evading the
quota restrictions... or an investigation of the alien at
the place of his former home, or residence or
elsewhere.1 0
However, Congress did not explicitly make refugees a separate
category for admission to the United States until 1965.
The Act of October 3, 1965, amended the INA to make
refugees part of a new category for admission. Section three of
the 1965 Act stated that refugees included those who
because of persecution or fear of persecution on account
of race, religion or political opinion... have fled from
any Communist or Communist-dominated country or
" Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163, 166-73 (1952).
8 "The conference draft as enacted provided 205,000 special nonquota
visas for eligible refugees and their spouses and unmarried children under
twenty-one years of age, including stepchildren and adopted children. The
visas were to be apportioned as specified to fourteen classes of eligibles, of
which the largest were 55,000 for German expellees residing in West Germany,
West Berlin and Austria, 45,000 to refugees of Italian ethnic origin, and 35,000
to escapees in West Germany, West Berlin, and Austria. There were in
addition 4,000 nonquota visas provided for eligible orphans under ten years of
age and adopted or to be adopted by citizens." HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at
319.
9 Id. at 524.
10 Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, sec. 7, § 241, 71 Stat. 639,
641.
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area, or from any country within the general area of
the Middle East, and are unable or unwilling to return
to such country or area on account of race, religion, or
political opinion."
Congress also specified that the refugee category should not
represent more than 6 percent of the total quota for aliens. 2
This act ended the overt selection of immigrants based on
national origin, race, or ancestry; previously, immigration law
explicitly preferenced Europeans."
The Refugee Act of 1980 established the current framework
for admission of refugees, defining a refugee as
any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 4
According to the legislative history, the Refugee Act was not
meant to solve the refugee problem. It was intended to create
"a solid foundation for our refugee policy for many years to
come."'5  This is in keeping with the history of American
immigration law, which has evolved to cope with changing
circumstances and changing attitudes toward refugees.
n Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 3, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911.
12 Id.
13 HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at 377.
14 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201, § 101(a)(42), 94 Stat.
102, 102-03 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988)). The original version,
proposed in 1979, did not use gender-neutral language: "The term 'refugee'
means any person who is outside any country of his nationality or... is
outside any country in which he last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of,
that country...." H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(42) (1979)
(emphasis added).
15 Hearings on the Refugee Act of 1979, supra note 2, at 20 (statement of
Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General).
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B. INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
The American definition of "refugee" originated in language
created by the United Nations. 6 Congress based its definition
on Article I of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("the Convention"),17 as modified by Article I of the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ("the
Protocol").'" These documents entered into force with respect to
16 The Conference Committee Report states that the definition was
accepted with the "understanding that it is based directly upon the language
of the Protocol [relating to the Status of Refugees] and it is intended that the
provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." S. REP. No. 590, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
17 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter the Convention].
General Provisions, Art. I states:
For purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall
apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12
May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October
1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or
the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee
Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the
status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions
of paragraph 2 of this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id.
" The Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267. The Protocol states:
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 covers only those persons who have
become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the
Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may
therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed
by all refugees covered by the definition in the Convention
irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951,
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the United States on November 1, 1968, when the United States
ratified the Protocol.
Congress did not draft the language of the refugee
definition, choose to alter it substantially, or even debate the
particular wording of the Protocol's definition. Congress
adopted the Protocol language "less to fix a particular vision of
the refugee into law than to guarantee United States fulfillment
of extant international obligations."' 9  In construing the
definition, our courts routinely look to UN interpretations and
intent for guidance.2 °
In the aftermath of World War II, the newly-created United
Nations formed both the International Refugee Organization
("IRO")2' and an Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a convention on
refugees. The lack of a comprehensive system to deal with the
large numbers of European refugees motivated these actions.22
A conference later convened in Geneva to complete the
drafting so that non-members of the UN could participate in the
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
GENERAL PROVISION
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall,
except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article,
mean any person within the definition of article I of the Convention
as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951 and.. ." and the words"... as a result of such events", in
article I A (2) were omitted.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19 T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under
the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee,
92 COLuM. L. REV. 923, 925 (1992).
21 Id. at 926.
2 1 See GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 71-73
(1983).
' As Nehemiah Robinson explains,
With the end of World War II the problem of refugees assumed far
greater dimensions than ever before, but the only international
agreement to be signed in their behalf was the London Agreement
of October 15, 1946, concerning the issuance of travel documents to
refugees from Germany and Austria, Spanish refugees and some
smaller groups... [Als of [1953,1 it has been accepted by 18 states;
an additional number of states are implementing it informally.
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS
HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION 3 (1953).
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process. The UN General Assembly recommended that the
participating governments take the draft convention into
consideration. While the Ad Hoc Committee had consisted of
representatives from only thirteen governments, delegates at
the conference represented twenty-six states.3 However, the
states represented were Western and Eastern European, with
the majority of states being Western.'
To create the refugee definition, the delegates looked to
earlier texts, including the 1946 constitution of the IRO,25 which
entered into force in the United States on August 20, 1948. The
IRO defined a "refugee" as a person who had a "valid objection"
to returning to his or her country of nationality or former
habitual residence. "'Valid objections' included persecution or a
reasonable fear of persecution because of race, religion,
nationality or political opinions. "26
The IRO used language from the 1938 mandate of the Inter-
Governmental Committee on Refugees ("IGCR"). 2 17 "The IGCR
aided Germans and Austrians who had either fled their
countries or who had not already fled but had to emigrate on
account of their political opinions, religious beliefs, or racial
origin.28
Representatives at the Geneva conference introduced
another category - membership in a social group - "as an
afterthought. " 29 This category was not defined as clearly as the
others, because it did not share the same historical background.
The drafting committee, which incorporated these terms into the
Convention in 1951, stated that the expression "well-founded
2Id. at 5.
4 "[W]hen it came to the question of defining the term 'refugee' and of the
treatment to be accorded to refugees, it was apparent that there was a very
great difference between the views of the countries of the West, who were in
the majority, and those of the minority group composed of the Eastern
European states." Ren6 Ristelhueber, The International Refugee Organization,
in INTERNATIONAL CONciLTATION 167, 179 (1951).
' The IRO operated for six years and aided in the resettlement of
approximately 1,620,000 refugees. It was succeeded by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 72.
26 Linda Dale Bevis, Note, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting
International Sources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395, 398 (1988) (citations omitted).
27 1d
2 Id. at 398-99.
" ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
219 (1966).
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fear of being the victim of persecution" meant that "a person has
either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good
reason why he fears persecution."3 In 1967, the "well-founded
fear" language was incorporated into the Protocol without
modification.
C. ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE DEFINITION
To achieve refugee status in the United States, the
petitioner must show a well-founded fear of persecution on the
basis of at least one of five characteristics - race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."' Tools for interpreting the refugee definition include
immigration regulations, the courts, the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ("UNHCR
Handbook"),32 and administrative decisions of the Board of
Immi gration Appeals ("BIA"). 3 This Article will describe each
element of the definition, including the current categories. It
30 ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 48 (citations omitted).
31 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
An applicant shall be found to have a well-founded fear of
persecution if he can establish, first, that he has a fear of
persecution in his country of nationality or last habitual residence
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, second, that there is a reasonable
possibility of actually suffering such persecution if he were to return
to that country, and third, that he is unable or unwilling to return
to or avail himself of the protection of that country because of such
fear.
8 C.F.R. § 208 (1993).
3 2 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONvENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
3 As one commentator noted,
The Handbook offers guidance in determining refugee status to
governments that signed the Convention or Protocol. The Handbook
bases its analysis of the Protocol refugee definition on the experience
of the UNHCR, which includes knowledge of current national
practices and literature about refugees. In acceding to the Protocol,
the United States agreed to cooperate with the UNHCR. United
States Courts accept the Handbook as a persuasive guide, though
not binding authority, in determining refugee status.
Bevis, supra note 26, at 399.
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will then focus on the categories under which women commonly
bring claims - social group and political opinion.
As stated above, an applicant for refugee status must show
(1) a "well-founded fear of persecution," that is (2) on the basis
of at least one of the five categories. The "well-founded fear"
element encompasses both subjective and objective factors. The
refugee "must show he has a subjective fear of persecution, and
that the fear is grounded in objective facts."34 To satisfy the
objective factor, it is enough to show that there would be a
reasonable possibility of persecution if the petitioner were to
return to his or her country.
3 5
To prove persecution, the petitioner must present some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the persecutor's motive. 6
Persecution, as interpreted by the courts, occurs only when a
difference between the persecutor's views or status and that of
the victim causes the victim's harm or fear of harm. According
to the Ninth Circuit, persecution is oppression "inflicted on
groups or individuals because of a difference that the persecutor
will not tolerate."3 "
The term persecution has no universally accepted definition,
but under the Convention, "it may be inferred that a threat to
life or freedom... [and] other serious violations of human
rights... on account of [any one of the five categories].., is
always persecution."38 The threat of persecution may come from
the government itself or from groups which the government is
Saleh v. United States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234,239 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citing Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Melendez v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1991); Carcamo-
Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
35 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1993). "[A] moderate interpretation of the 'well-
founded fear' standard would indicate 'that so long as an objective situation is
established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will
probably result in prosecution, but it is enough that prosecution is a reasonable
possibility."' INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (citing INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1984)).
"
6In Elias-Zacarias, "the Court made clear that a petitioner alleging
persecution must present some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the
persecutor's motive. 112 S. Ct. at 816-17. This motive requirement stems from
section 1101's 'persecution on account of language." Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970
F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812
(1992)).
17 Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
3 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 32, 1 51.
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"unwilling or unable to control, 3 and the threat must be on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."
The UNHCR Handbook defines race and nationality largely
by common usage.4' Religion encompasses both beliefs and
practices.42 Persecution for religious reasons may assume
various forms, including prohibiting membership in a particular
religion, worship in private or in public, or religious
instruction. 3 It may also consist of serious discriminatory
measures imposed on groups because of their religion or
membership in a particular religious community." The political
opinion and social group categories are more troublesome
1. Political Opinion
Under the Supreme Court's reasoning in INS v. Elias-
Zacarias,5 petitioners seeking to prove refugee status on the
basis of political opinion must establish that they actually
possess political opinions. 8 The Court held that "[a] mere act,
such as resisting forced conscription, is insufficient to establish
the existence of this 'political opinion.' Such opinions can,
however, be shown by proving that the applicants' motives for
acting were political."47  Refusal to take sides in a political
9 Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing McMullen
v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)).
40 SeeArteaga, 836 F.2d at 1231 (citing Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d
1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)); Canas-Segovia, 970 F.2d
at 601 ("[In Elias-Zacarias,l [tihe Court explained that.., the victim must tie
the persecution to a protected cause. To do this, the victim needs to show the
persecutor had a protected basis (such as the victim's political opinion) in mind
in undertaking the persecution.").
41 Race "has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of
ethnic groups that are referred to as 'races' in common usage." UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 32, 68. "The term 'nationality'... is not to be
understood only as 'citizenship.' It refers also to membership of an ethnic or
linguistic group and may occasionally overlap with the term 'race."' Id. 1 74.
42 Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992).
4 3UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 32, 1 72.
44 Id.
45 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
4Id. at 816.
" Craig A. Fielden, Note, Persecution on Account of Political Opinion:
"Refugee" Status After INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), 67 WASH.
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dispute, according to the Court, does not satisfy the political
opinion requirement. 8 Petitioners must also show that the
persecutor's acts were motivated by the petitioner's opinions.49
However, whether the persecutor's motives were political is
irrelevant.50
Before Elias-Zacarias, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
political opinion category more broadly.51 According to the
earlier Ninth Circuit view, the political opinion category focuses
largely on the petitioner's beliefs. 2 Accordingly, political
opinion imputed to the petitioner by the persecutor is a valid
basis for relief under United States refugee law. However, as
imputed political opinion by definition includes an element of
motive, there is really no difference in standards." The Ninth
Circuit found that "it is not crucial whether the individual
actually espoused the views.., what is determinative is what
the persecutors thought."5 4 This broader view conforms better
with UN descriptions of this category than the Supreme Court's
interpretation.
2. Particular Social Group
The particular social group category "encompass[es] 'a
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest.'... Like the
traits which distinguish the other four enumerated categories,
the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable
and discrete."55 The individuals in that group must share a
"common immutable characteristic" or "the common
L. REV. 959, 968-69 (1992).
48 112 S. Ct. at 815-16.
49Id.
5 0 Id. at 816.
1 The Ninth Circuit's analysis of "political opinion" strengthens women's
claims for refugee status due to gender-specific persecution. Under this
broader analysis, a woman's imputed opposition to domination by a man was
held to be a political opinion. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1987).
52Id.
5s Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1992).
Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1990).
5 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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characteristic that defines the group... must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences."56
Some commentators have construed the "particular social
group" category more broadly.5" For example, Maryellen
Fullerton describes the arguments of Arthur Helton,
[who] argues that it is significant that the refugee
definition refers to social group rather than to ethnic
group, minority group, or cultural group. He points out
that social group is broader than the other terms ....
[T]he term social group can encompass all of these
sets .... Accordingly, he concludes that the choice of
the term social group demonstrates an intent to
formulate a broad, inclusive refugee definition."
This is similar to the construction provided by the UNHCR
Handbook, which states, "A 'particular social group' normally
comprises persons of similar backgrounds, habits or social
status. A claim to fear of persecution under this heading may
frequently overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other
grounds, i.e. race, religion or nationality."59
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that "the 'social
group' category is a flexible one which extends broadly to
encompass many groups who do not otherwise fall within the
56 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
5 "Many cases falling under this term are also covered by the terms [race,
religion and nationality], but the notion of 'social group' is of broader
application than the combined notions of racial, ethnic and religious groups,
and in order to stop a possible gap, the Conference felt that it would be as well
to mention this reason for persecution explicitly." GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note
29, at 219. See also Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social
Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 739 (1989);
Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as
a Badis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 39 (1983).
58 Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 17, on file with The Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy) (citing Helton, supra note 57, at 43-44).
59 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 32, 1 77.
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other categories of race, nationality, religion, or political
opinion."6 At the same time,
a "particular social group" implies a collection of people
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by
some common impulse or interest. Of central concern
is the existence of a voluntary associational
relationship among the purported members, which
imparts some common characteristic that is
fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group.""1
The case law consistently suggests two criteria: distinguishable
group dimensions and persecution visibly targeting the social
group.
62
II. TREATMENT OF GENDER-SPECIFIC
PERSECUTION CLAIMS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A government or an individual can subject women to many
types of persecution. Some are similar to persecution suffered
by men, but others are unique to women. Women refugees'
claims fall under four different categories.6 ' The first category
is women who fear persecution on the same grounds and in the
same circumstances as men. Second, there are women who fear
persecution because of kinship ties, such as persecution due to
the status, activities, or views of their spouses, fathers, or other
family members. Third, there are women who fear persecution
resulting from severe sexual discrimination, either by public
authorities or at the hands of private citizens whose actions the
state is unwilling or unable to control. Finally, there are
women who fear persecution for transgressing sexually
o Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
61 Id.
6
' David L. Neal, Note, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based
Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 234
(1988).
6 Cf. Nancy Kelly, Gender-Based Persecution: Assessing the Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 35-
36, on file with The Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy) (classifying six
categories of gender-specific persecution).
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discriminatory religious or customary norms or practices in
their country of origin. This Article focuses only on the last two
types of gender-specific persecution - severe sexual
discrimination and persecution for transgressing religious or
customary norms - because the current system largely fails to
recognize them as grounds for granting refugee status."
Some opponents of granting refugee status to victims of
gender-specific persecution may argue that even practices as
harmful as female genital mutilation are part of established
cultural traditions; thus, outsiders should not judge or interfere
with these traditions. In cases involving refugees, the potential
victim has chosen to flee instead of participating in this
tradition. When a woman disagrees and opposes an established
system or tradition, and expresses her disagreement by fleeing,
we should respect her beliefs, rather than forcing the tradition
upon her. Unfortunately, under current law the legal issue is
not the victim's right to disagree with tradition, but whether the
intended victim has a "well-founded fear of persecution" based
on one of the existing categories of the refugee definition.
Therein lies the problem for many women fleeing female genital
mutilation and other forms of gender-specific oppression.
A. ExAMPLES OF GENDER-SPECIFIC PERSECUTION
1. Female Genital Mutilation
Aminata Diop left her home in Mali to avoid genital
mutilation. The night before she was to undergo the procedure,
Diop walked out of her home in southern Mali. She ended up in
France, where she applied for asylum. French refugee law, like
United States refugee law, originated with the Protocol and the
Convention. Her lawyer argued that Diop had a well-founded
fear of persecution based on her political opinion. The French
government allowed her to stay, but did not give a reason.65
61 For an example of a broader conception of gender-based persecution, see
Article I of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33, which
provides a right to asylum and defines discrimination against women as "any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women.., of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field." Id. at 36.
65 Toni Y. Joseph & Mark McDonald, Woman Rallies World Against
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Women who are subjected to genital mutilation,6 which
includes clitoridotomy, citoridectomy,"7 and infibulation clearly
fall into the latter two categories of gender-specific persecution
discussed above. Clitoridotomy or "female circumcision"
involves an incision in or removal of the prepuce of the clitoris.68
Clitoridectomy or clitorectomy involves excision of the clitoris
and'usually the surrounding tissue. 9 Infibulation7 is the most
mutilating of these procedures. In an infibulation, the
practitioner removes the clitoris, labia minora, and most of the
labia majora.7 ' After the organ is scraped off, the practitioner
sews up the sides of the vulva leaving a hole the size of a match
stick. 2
Clitoridotomy, clitoridectomy, and infibulation are
performed largely in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, although
the practices occur worldwide." The mutilation is most
prevalent among animists and Moslems, 4 although it is
sometimes found among Jews, Copts and other Christian sects.75
Circumcision, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 5, 1992, at C6. Diop was given a "carte
de sejour" and a "carte de travail," which are the equivalents of a green card.
She has been denied asylum twice, but these documents give her permission
to remain in France indefinitely. Id.
The medical profession calls the removal of a healthy organ mutilation.
Angela Singer, Female Circumcision -A Tradition of Tragedy, Universal
News Service Ltd., Oct. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UNS File.
67 Although they are actually different procedures, both clitoridotomy and
clitoridectomy are often collectively referred to as cliteridectomy.
6 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRAITED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 338 (27th ed. 1988);
ELIZABETH WILLIAMS MORN, GENITAL MUTILATION: EVERYwOMAN'S PROBLEM
2 (Mich. St. U. Working Papers on Women in Intl Dev. No. 22, 1983).
69 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 346.
70 The term infibulation "is derived from the clasp which the Romans used
to fasten their togas and sometimes the genitals of their male slaves." Andrea
Singer, Female Circumcision; Because It's Always Been Done, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 18, 1982, at 42.
71 FEMALE CIRCUMCISION, EXCISION AND INFIBULATION: THE FACTS AND
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 3 (The Minority Rights Group, Report No. 47, Scilla
McLean & Stella E. Graham eds., 1983) [hereinafter FEMALE CIRCUMCISION].
72 MOEN, supra note 68, at 2. 'Women walk around in a characteristic
shuffle... because they have been sewn so tightly, they are barely able to lift
their legs." Moses Manoharan, REUTER LIBR. REP., Feb. 5, 1991.
73 FEMALE CIRCUMCISION, supra note 71, at 6.
4 It is known to pre-date Islam. Singer, supra note 70.
75 Id.
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A term for infibulation, "pharaonic circumcision," indicates
origins in ancient Egypt." World Health Organization officials
estimate that between seventy-five and eighty-five million
women worldwide have undergone the procedures.
Societies practice genital mutilation for traditional and
cultural reasons: to ensure female chastity and because of a
mistaken belief that the procedures are hygienics.7  Depending
on the region, practitioners perform genital mutilation on girls
from infancy to puberty. It is often done without anesthetic and
under unsanitary conditions.79 It often results in infection,
psychological trauma, infertility because of constant
inflammation of the vaginal area, and severe scarring 0°
The mutilation often makes it physically impossible for a
woman to enjoy sexual intercourse. Before an infibulated
woman's wedding or on her wedding night, the scar tissue must
be opened to allow penetration. Often, the husband, his
relatives, or ceremonial women create the opening with a
dagger."' The cutting may result in severe complications if the
dagger cuts internal organs.8" Even the "mildest" female genital
mutilation, clitoridotomy, may eliminate a woman's physical
enjoyment of sexual intercourse. Because the glans clitoridis is
the area in which orgasms in women originate, its mutilation
7
' The Egyptians, in turn, called infibulation "Sudanese circumcision." Id.
" Joseph & McDonald, supra note 65.
71 FEMALE CIRCUMCISION, supra note 71, at 7-8 (Infibulation clearly has
the opposite effect to that of promoting hygiene; urine and menstrual blood
which cannot escape naturally, secrete and result in discomfort, odour and
infection."); Robyn C. Smith, Note, Female Circumcision: Bringing Women's
Perspectives into the International Debate, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2449, 2481-86
(1992) (describing the multiple motives behind the practice of female
circumcision).
" Often the girl is held down and the operation is performed by a
midwife, other older women, or even the girl's mother. "Slivers of wood or
match sticks are used to stop the vagina from sealing fully. Kitchen knives,
razor blades or pieces of glass are used in the operation and stitching is with
silk, catgut or thorns. Girls may have their legs bound for 40 days to allow
scar tissue to form." David Nicholson-Lord, Fears That 10,000 Girls Face
Threat of Circumcision, INDEPENDENT, July 7, 1992, at 4.
80 MOEN, supra note 68, at 2-3.
81 Id. at 2; FEMALE CIRCUMCISION, supra note 71, at 5.
82 MOEN, supra note 68, at 3.
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lessens or eliminates the ability of a woman to have an
orgasm.
8 3
Genital mutilation can also lead to complications in
childbirth because of the inelasticity of scar tissue; this can
cause the death of the mother, the fetus, or both.' The
resulting deaths often go unreported due to the traditional
silence that surrounds the practice.85
2. Pervasive Discrimination
Pervasive discrimination is another example of gender-
specific persecution. For example, religious laws in Saudi
Arabia require women to veil their faces or be flogged with
bamboo sticks by the religious police for dressing or acting
immodestly. According to Alex Neve, Amnesty International's
acting refugee coordinator, women who refuse to wear the veil
also face imprisonment.86  Similar to citoridectomy, forcing
women to wear veils in Saudi Arabia fits into both of the
classifications of gender-specific persecution discussed in this
Article.
The Canadian government recently granted a Saudi
Arabian woman special dispensation to remain in Canada.87
The woman said that she would be in grave danger if she
returned to her home country because of her views on the status
of women there.8 The woman, known simply as Nada because
of fear of reprisals against her family still in Saudi Arabia, had
refused to wear the veil." Nada's lawyer argued that she was
persecuted because of her feminist political beliefs and her
83Id.; FEMALE CIRcUMCIsION, supra note 71, at 5.
4 Singer, supra note 70.
8 MOEN, supra note 68, at 2.
8 8Jacquie Miller, Minister Won't Help Saudi "Feminist Refugee", OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Sept. 9, 1992, at Al.
87Mary Williams Walsh, Battered Women as Refugees, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
23, 1993, at A12.
I Miller, supra note 86, at Al.
89 Id.
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membership in a social group,90 and therefore was a refugee
under Canadian law which had adopted the Protocol definition.
Nada told the immigration panel that when walking down
the streets of her hometown without a veil, she was jeered at
and had rocks thrown at her.91 She could not study at the best
universities, and some occupations were closed to her.92 She
could not drive or travel without the permission of a male
relative.9 But Nada had decided that she wanted to go to
school and become a physical education teacher.94
The Canadian refugee board members who decided Nada's
case said she did not prove she was or would be the victim of
cruel or unusual punishment.95 The two male panelists told her
to go home, observe her country's laws, and "show consideration
for the feelings of her father."96 In a reversal of the Canadian
refugee board, Canadian Immigration Minister Bernard
Valcourt gave Nada special dispensation to stay in Canada,
citing "humanitarian and compassionate grounds."9" However,
Nada's victory was incomplete. She "still isn't classified as a
refugee, and her case sets no precedent for other women.""8
Largely in response to Nada's case, Valcourt said that the
government would study "the issue of how refugee law can be
used to protect women fleeing persecution or abuse based on
their sex."9 9 New guidelines released by the Immigration and
Refugee Board in March of 1993 "provide advice on how to deal
90 "Nada's lawyer argued that Nada was persecuted in Saudi Arabia
because of her political beliefs - feminism - and her social group -
women .... " Jacquie Miller, A Saudi Arabian Woman, Seeking to Escape Her
Country's Restrictive Laws, Has Been Denied Asylum in Canada. Now in
Hiding, She Says She's a "Feminist Refugee. ", OTrAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 4, 1992,
at Al.
91 Miller, supra note 86.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
s Miller, supra note 90.
96 Walsh, supra note 87.
97 Kim Lunman, Safe at Last: Canada's New Refugee Guidelines Offer
Hope - and Security - for Battered Women from Other Countries, CALGARY
HERALD, July 4, 1993, at Bi.
9 Walsh, supra note 87.
9 Jacquie Miller, Feminist Refugee Can Stay; Strong Message to Decision
Makers, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1993, at Al.
GENDER PERSECUTION & REFUGEE STATUS
with women who fear everything from spousal abuse to rape.
They include persecution unique to female claimants, such as
infanticide, forced marriages, bride burnings, compulsory
sterilization and genital mutilation.""1 ' Some commentators,
however, say that the guidelines are "moot because they do not
have the force of law behind them."101
The new guidelines broaden the United Nations' definition
of a refugee by including women persecuted because of their
gender in the social group category. 10 2 Nada reacted to the new
guidelines by saying, "I was happy to see the guidelines, but at
the same time I think adding gender to the refugee definition
would be better. But at least they are going to look at cases of
gender persecution and take them seriously. It's a first step.'10 3
3. Rape
Rape is a third example of gender-specific persecution.
Depending on the surrounding circumstances, rape can be
classified under any combination of the four categories of
women claiming refugee status. The case of Muslim women in
Bosnia provides a good example. Although these women fear
persecution due to kinship ties, the persecution they fear is
largely gender-specific and at the hands of private citizens who
the government is unable to control.
A European Community team of investigators found that
during a nine month period, over 20,000 Slavic Muslim, Croat,
and Serbian women and girls in Bosnia were raped.' Muslim
women formed the vast majority of rape victims. 5 Rape was
o Lunman, supra note 97.
101 Id.
10 2 LGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES: WOMEN REFUGEE
CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER RELATED PERSECUTION, 1993 (unpublished
guidelines, on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy).
..
3 Nada, A Serious Step Toward Accepting Female Refugees, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Mar. 11, 1993, at A13.
' Juan Gasparini, Bosnia-Hercegovina: EC Report Defines Rape as a
War Crime, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INPRES File. See generally Stephanie Nebehay, EC Group Says
20,000 Moslem Women Raped by Serbs, REUTER EuR. COMMUNITY REP., Jan.
8, 1993 , available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ECRPT File (discussing the
general view of the EC report that a "horrifying number of Moslem women had
suffered rape and that this was continuing").
105 William Drozdiak, Serbs Raped 20,000, EC Team Says; Assaults on
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part of a systematic policy of terror designed to intimidate,
demoralize, and drive certain groups of people from their
homes."' 6 The EC report stated that "viewed in this way, rape
cannot be seen as incidental to the main purpose of the
aggression, but as serving a strategic purpose in itself.'107 Rape,
or the threat of rape, was used "as a weapon of war."' ' The
report also noted that the Serbs carried out the rapes "in
particularly sadistic ways to inflict maximum humiliation on the
victims."'0 9 Many women and children may have died during or
after these rapes."0
Bosnian Muslim women fit the historic international
refugee paradigm, because even though their persecution is
gender-specific, it is on account of their religion, race, or
nationality."' However, because the claims of these women are
based on persecution in the form of sexual assault, it is very
difficult for them to successfully establish their claims."'
Bosnia Part of 'Cleansing', WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at A12.
" Gasparini, supra note 104.
.07 Drozdiak, supra note 105.
108 "Women who are political activists, community organizers, or human
rights workers have been targeted because they are strong. Soldiers and
policemen use rape or sexual abuse to humiliate these women and sometimes
to punish them for their political or social independence." AMNEsTY INT'L, 1992
RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN
DETENTION 3.
109 '20,000 Rapes' in Bosnia Report Accuses Serbs of Attacks on Muslims,
TORONTO STAR, Jan. 9, 1993, at Al.
11o Id.
m See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
12 This form of persecution is difficult to prove:
Few women are able to talk about such experiences to a male
interviewer and very few countries have female staff involved in
their refugee determination procedures. Even where a woman has
been persecuted (that is, subjected to such cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment as sexual assault), she thus finds it more
difficult to establish her claim than a man.
Anders B. Johnsson, The International Protection of Women Refugees: A
Summary of Principle Problems and Issues, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 221, 223
(1989).
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B. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FEMALE REFUGEES IN THE
UNITED STATES
In El Salvador, a country that is also racked by civil war,
the politicized rape and abuse of women is widespread.13 As in
Bosnia, when the case does not exactly fit the paradigm, women
often have no recourse. As the cases of Sofia Campos-Guardado
and Olimpia Lazo-Majano illustrate, women's claims under
current domestic law must, either be forced into the existing
categories or disregarded.
In 1984, Sofia Campos-Guardado petitioned for refugee
status in the United States. Earlier that year, while still in El
Salvador, she went to visit her uncle. As the chairman of the
local agricultural cooperative, which had been formed as the
result of a controversial agrarian land reform movement, he
held the cooperative's money. The day before Campos-
Guardado's visit, two men demanded that her uncle turn over
the money. During Campos-Guardado's visit, an older woman
and two young men with rifles arrived and knocked down the
door. They dragged Campos-Guardado, her uncle, one male
cousin, and three female cousins outside. They forced the
women to watch as they hacked the flesh from the men's bodies
with machetes. Then they raped the women, including Campos-
Guardado, while the older woman who accompanied the
attackers shouted political slogans. After suffering a nervous
breakdown, Campos-Guardado returned to work at a factory in
San Salvador. On her first visit home, she was introduced to
two of her cousins. She recognized one of the cousins as one of
her attackers. On several occasions, the cousin threatened to
kill her and her family if she revealed his identity. When the
factory was burned down by guerrillas, she fled to the United
States.114
1 
"See Adrianne Aron et al., Gender Specific Terror of El Salvador and
Guatemalans: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Central American Refugee
Women, 14 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 37 (1991). "Not uncommonly, women are
also subjected to ordeals such as forced nudity (sometimes including
photographs), electroshock to the nipples and vagina, squeezing or tying of the
breasts, hanging by the breasts, vaginal or anal rape with objects, mutilation
of the body, and forcible witnessing of any of the above, or hearing the screams
of women going through those experiences." Id. at 39.
14 Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 826 (1987).
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Campos-Guardado based her claim on two grounds,
"political opinion" and "membership in a particular social
group." She asserted that she was persecuted for political
opinions attributed to her by her assailants "on account of her
family membership, and because of the concomitant association
of the family with the agrarian land reform movement.""' 5 The
BIA denied her claim. On appeal, Campos-Guardado argued:
(1) that the INA contemplated persecution on the basis of
political opinions imputed to the petitioner, whether rightly or
wrongly, by the persecutor; and (2) that the BIA, by imposing a
prerequisite that the alien personally hold the political opinion,
misconstrued the INA." 6
The Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA's decision that Ms.
Campos-Guardado had failed to show that the harm she feared
was on account of "political opinion" or "membership in a social
group" as those terms are used in the INA."' Campos-
Guardado did not establish that she was persecuted on account
of political opinions that "she herself possessed or was believed
by the attackers to have possessed," group membership, or a
combination of both."8
In a second case brought by a woman from El Salvador the
appellant did successfully achieve refugee status, but only after
the court fit her situation into an existing category. In 1983,
Olimpia Lazo-Majano applied for refugee status. A year after
her husband had left El Salvador for political reasons, Rene
Zuniga, a sergeant in the Salvadoran military whom she had
known since childhood, asked her to work for him. Six weeks
after she began working in his house, he began to rape and beat
her. Zuniga told her that if she defied him, he would denounce
her as a subversive, and would "have her tongue cut off, her
nails removed one by one, her eyes pulled out" and would kill
her."9 Lazo-Majono feared that because of his membership in
the military, Zuniga would carry out these threats. Thus, Lazo-
Majano fled to the United States.
The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal for
asylum stating that "the fact remains that such strictly personal
actions do not constitute persecution within the meaning of the
1 5 Id. at 288.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 289.
118 Id.
119 Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Act."'" The Ninth Circuit reversed, citing Lazo-Majano's
imputed political opinion. The court first looked to the social
context, and found that:
Zuniga is asserting the political opinion that a man has
a right to dominate and he has persecuted Olimpia to
force her to accept this opinion without rebellion.
Zuniga told Olimpia that in his treatment of her he was
seeking revenge. But Olimpia knew of no injury she
had ever done Zuniga. His statement reflects a more
generalized animosity to the opposite sex, an assertion
of a political aspiration and the desire to suppress
opposition to it.... Olimpia has suffered persecution
because of one specific political opinion Zuniga
attributed to her.12'
The Ninth Circuit went on to say that "[e]ven if she had no
political opinion and was innocent of a single reflection on the
government of her country, the cynical imputation of political
opinion to her is what counts [because] if the persecutor thinks
the person guilty of a political opinion, then the person is at
risk."'"2  Thus, in denying Lazo-Majano's application for
withholding of deportation, the BIA had abused its discretion. s
In both of the above cases the petitioners could have argued
that political opinions could be imputed to the petitioners based
on familial relationships,' 4 that the persecutor was someone
who the government was unwilling or unable to control, and
that the petitioners' fear of continued persecution upon their
return was based on the fact that the persecutors knew their
families and where they lived.
The BIA found the petitioners' testimony credible in both
cases, but based its decision on the finding that the women had
not proven that their persecution was based on one of the five
categories. 5 In the case of Lazo-Majano, on appeal the Ninth
120 Id.
12 1 1d at 1435.
'Id.
Id. at 1436.
These cases were decided prior to INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812
(1992) (holding that imputed political opinion is not a cognizable legal ground
for a grant of asylum).
' Neither Immigration Judge Nail nor the Board doubted Olimpia's
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Circuit imputed a political opinion to the petitioner, even
though she was not shown to harbor one, and the petitioner
herself testified that her persecutor would have made the same
threats and committed the same violent acts had he not been a
member of the military. 26  Further, according to the
immigration judge, Lazo-Majano described Zuniga as a common
police officer, not a person of rank or authority. She did not
complain to his superior officers about his treatment of her, and
she admitted that she would not have sought the assistance of
authorities even if Zuniga had not been an army officer.
The dissent argued that Zuniga acted, not in his official
capacity, but as an individual "motivated by nothing more than
his own 'exaggerated machismo,' the rampaging lust-hate of the
common rapist,"'27 and that it was unclear that the government
would have refrained from attempting to control him. In fact,
the dissent questioned whether the petitioner's relationship
with her persecutor was involuntary, given that she did not
complain to the authorities or attempt to leave." Under this
possible interpretation, it is uncertain that Zuniga's acts
amount to the statutory equivalent of political persecution, any
more than the acts of the cousin/assailant in Campos-
Guardado's case. One must question why these cases reached
opposite outcomes. The two cases further illustrate that
attempting to fit a claim based on gender-specific persecution
within an existing category is a difficult means through which
to apply for refugee status.
story. It must be assumed that they found her testimony credible. They
reached their unfavorable decision on the basis that Olimpia had not met the
legal requirements of the applicable statutes. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d
1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987).
Although the Board assumed the veracity of Ms. Campos's account of the
events at her uncle's house, and that the attack resulted from her uncle's
political view, it nevertheless concluded that Ms. Campos "had not shown that
the attackers harmed her in order to overcome any of her own political
opinions." Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 826 (1987).
126 Lazo-Majano, 813 F.2d at 1438 (Poole, J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1440.
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HI. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT
REFUGEE DEFINITION
A. THE DEFINITION AS APPLIED BY UNITED STATES COURTS
Whether a woman fleeing persecution in her country will be
admitted as a refugee to the United States depends on how well
her situation fits into one of the five categories enumerated in
the current Refugee Act. Achieving this fit is problematic for
women, given the history and practical application of the
refugee definition.
Although the current refugee definition is broader than the
pre-World War II definition, 9 it does not contemplate gender-
specific persecution. The current definition is based on an
outdated model 30 that is designed to address refugee flows from
white, Western countries during the Cold War.' 3 ' The aims of
the current refugee policy, preserving sovereignty and other
domestic interests by "'managing' or preventing refugee flows,"
seem to have "surpassed both the goal of stopping the violence
that forces people to flee and of assisting and protecting those
who have managed to escape."'1 2 Thus, the refugee definition
does not focus on the practical needs of the refugee population.
The key criterion for determining refugee status under the
current Act is persecution. Persecution usually requires a
specific act against the individual. 3 ' By requiring a specific act,
the definition of persecution excludes generalized conditions of
insecurity and oppression.'3 " Similarly, the definition also
1 "This refugee definition is broader than prior practice in two ways. It
links refugee status to those who have a basis for fearing persecution rather
than to a specific crisis or a specific nationality group. Moreover, it expands
the reasons that warrant refugee status." Fullerton, supra note 58, at 3.
"
80 The United Nations formulated the current international definitions
"in the immediate post-World War H period, largely in response to European
refugee flows. Contemporary movements, by contrast, originate primarily in
the Third World. This has raised questions about the relevance of conventional
concepts to current realities." Astri Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and
Strategies of Response, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 157, 157
(Mary M. Kritz ed., 1983).
I"' Robinson, supra note 22, at 46-47.
112 Bill FrelickRefugees: Punishing the Victims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 31, 1992, at 18.
1-3 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
' In discussing the concept of a refugee embodied in the Refugee Act,
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excludes general exploitation or an atmosphere of oppression
from the scope of persecution. Thus, it disproportionately
burdens women, who, due to their lower social status, are more
likely to suffer from general exploitation and denial of many
general rights and opportunities afforded to men.
Moreover, it is not sufficient for the petitioner to simply
demonstrate the existence of persecution. She must also show
that she has experienced or that she fears such persecution on
account of one of the five existing categories. This "limited set
of -cognizable grounds of persecution adversely affects
international refugee policy by preventing recognition of certain
types of persecution.""1 5  Specifically, this restriction has
impeded the development of doctrines which incorporate the
claims of women refugees and has inhibited women's ability to
tell their own stories.3 6
Additionally, even the process of applying for refugee status
provides an almost insurmountable obstacle for women
applicants. As Nancy Kelly states:
Because advocates have learned to present cases within
a largely male-oriented body of law, women's cases are
often formulated in ways which reflect the advocate's
understanding of the law rather than the reality of the
applicant's experiences. Additionally, the manner of
eliciting information from women applicants concerning
their experiences often leads to inaccurate
'characterizations of their claims.... Often a woman is
expected to repeat her story before a male interviewer
or immigration judge with the assistance of a male
Senator Alan K Simpson explained:
The statute says "persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion." That is all it says. So a country can be exceedingly
dangerous and perilous for human beings and in no case would that
qualify the people leaving that country as refugees under U.S.
law.... [Ilt really does not say that you can include a person in the
definition of refugee who is just scared to death of his country.
Parish, supra note 19, at 931.
" Donald P. Gagliardi, The Inadequacy of Cognizable Grounds of
Persecution as a Criterion for According Refugee Status, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L.
259, 276 (1987).
136 "For example, the claims of women are often presented as derivative
of the claims of their male partners or are based on the experiences of other
family members." Kelly, supra note 63, at 8.
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interpreter. She is subject to cross examination on the
details of her experience, and any discrepancy becomes
a ground to find that she is not credible and to deny
her claim. This difficulty is exacerbated for women
who, for cultural or religious reasons, will be ostracized
by their families or communities if the assault becomes
known.
137
Thus the current system places a heavier burden on women
seeking refugee status than on their male counterparts.
Additionally, despite the fact that modern legal theory is
"essentially and irretrievably masculine," '138  international
jurisprudence assumes that international law norms apply to
individuals universally and neutrally. It does not recognize that
international legal principles may affect women differently than
they affect men."9 Due to this lack of recognition, "women's
experiences of the operation of these laws tend to be silenced or
discounted."'4
The limitations in the UN definition also reflect the
political climate at the time it was adopted and the Western
liberal views of those who participated in its creation. The focus
of the United Nations at that time was on political, civic, and
legal rights, and negative freedoms valued by Western cultures
run by elite white males.
"The normative structure of international law has [also]
allowed issues of particular concern to women to be either
ignored or undermined,"'4 as exemplified by its replication of
the public/private dichotomy on two levels. On one level,
matters of international concern are "public," while other
matters are "private" to individual states. If private, the state
considers the matters within its domestic jurisdiction, "in which
the international community has no recognized legal interest."'42
On a second level, a dichotomy is drawn in terms of gender
between the public sphere and the private, domestic sphere. 143
M Id. at 8-10.
" Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(1988).
139 Charlesworth et al., supra note 6, at 625.
14oId.
141Id.
141 Id.; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
"1 Charlesworth et. al., supra note 6, at 626.
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"The public realm of the work place, the law, economics, politics
and intellectual and cultural life, where power and authority
are exercised, is regarded as the natural province of men; while
the private world of the home, the hearth and children is seen
as the appropriate domain of women."''
Feminist scholars have used this dichotomy to explain male
dominance in western society, since the two spheres have
historically been accorded asymmetrical value: greater
significance is attached to the public world than the private
one. 4 ' "The distinction drawn between the public and the
private thus vindicates and makes natural the division of labor
and allocation of rewards between the sexes. Its reproduction
and acceptance in all areas of knowledge have conferred
primacy on the male world and supported the dominance of
men."'46 Refugee law, created under these circumstances, "is
based on, for the most part, the experiences of male claimants
and thus overlooks 'female-specific experiences such
as... circumcision, '""' even though the majority of the world's
refugees are female." Moreover, of these women, the majority
are from "Third World" nations.49 This further disadvantages
them in a legal system that implicitly and explicitly privileges
people of European descent. 50 Under these circumstances, it is
144 Id.
145 Id.
1
46 Id.; see also HESTER EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOUGHT
15-26 (1983); Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281 (Stanley I. Benn &
Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983).
147 Mary W. Walsh, Battered Women as Refugees, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1993, at A12.
148 "Women and young girls now constitute most of the world's refugee
population." The Activities and Programmes of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees on Behalf of Refugee Women, World Conference to
Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for
Women: Equality, Development and Peace, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.116/11 (1985).
Forty-eight percent of refugees coming to the U.S. in 1991 were women.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE IMM. & NAT. SERV., 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK].
149 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1993, at 820 (Mark S.
Hoffman et al. eds., 1992).
50 See generally FRANCES C. WELSING, THE ISIS PAPERS: THE KEYS TO THE
COLORS (1991) (positing a theory of systemic racial oppression); BRUCE
WRIGHT, BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUSTICE (1987) (African-American judge
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not surprising that United States refugee law has "largely failed
to recognize the political nature of seemingly private acts of and
harm to" many women seeking refugee status.15'
B. ACADEMIC ATTEMPTS TO APPLY THE CURRENT
CATEGORIES TO GENDER-SPECIFIC PERSECUTION
This section will examine academic attempts to apply the
existing refugee categories to women fleeing gender-specific
persecution. These efforts focus on the two categories under
which women currently bring claims: political opinion and
membership in a social group. The failure of these efforts rests
at least partly on the conscious and unconscious discriminatory
attitudes discussed in the section above.
1. Political Opinion
Congress adopted the current definition of refugee,
including the political opinion category, to bring United States
law in line with UN guidelines.'52 Our courts often turn to UN
documents to clarify the elements of the refugee definition. 5 '
The UNHCR Handbook defines "political opinion" broadly.
"First, the Handbook states that a person may fear persecution
because of a political opinion even if that opinion has not yet
been expressed. Second, a mere act or refusal to act can
constitute the expression of a political opinion."'"M One IGCR
representative indicated that:
"political opinion" applied to people fleeing a range of
situations with political overtones, including people
who "weren't acceptable any more to the prevailing race
or creed or political school." This member believed that
describing racism in the American court system).
Furthermore, the highest refugee ceiling in 1991 was set for the Soviet
Union at 55,000, almost five times the ceiling set for Africa, Latin America/the
Carribean, and the Near East/South Asia combined. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK,
supra note 148, at 74.
11 See Kelly, supra note 63, at 7. "For example, rape, even when
committed by a government official or in a political context, is often viewed as
a private matter." Id.
152 See'supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
15 Id.
1
" Fielden, supra note 47, at 977.
1993] 207
208 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC PoLICY [Vol.3:179
refugees who feared persecution on account of political
opinion included not only persons persecuted by the
government, but also those who disagreed with the
government's policy of persecution, even though the
persecution was not aimed at them.'55
This broad definition of "political opinion" is especially
important to women, since their political protests are not always
manifested in the same way as those of men.156
The political opinion category should be broad enough to
accommodate all reasonable applications.'57 For instance, "[an
adjudicator could appropriately explore whether the victim's
actual or imputed opinion is 'political' within both the context of
the country of origin and the perceptions of the persecutor."'58
Thus, women in a male-dominated country who implicitly or
explicitly expressed the belief that men should not dominate
women would more easily qualify as refugees. There would also
be greater recognition of the government's role and whether or
not it failed to control the abuse and degradation of women.
The political nature of women's oppression in the context of
religious laws and ritualization could also be recognized. One
commentator, Maureen Mulligan, even argues that "there is
sufficient statutory and case law support for rape in particular
circumstances to be considered fear of persecution on account of
political opinion."'59  Yet, this approach leaves many claims
unheard and many women without protection, as it only
recognizes rape in cases where the prosecutorial system is
ineffective or where bringing a rape claim to authorities would
endanger the woman's life. 60
155 Bevis, supra note 26, at 405.
116 See supra notes 138-151 and accompanying text.
157 See Bevis, supra note 26, at 412-13. "While 'politics' and 'political' are
sometimes exclusively used to describe civil government, these words are also
generally recognized to describe patterns of human relationships that involve
control, influence, or power over allocations of spiritual values or material
goods." Id.; see also ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLrrICAL ANALYsIs 3 (3d ed.
1976).
"m Bevis, supra note 26, at 412.
159 Maureen Mulligan, Note, Obtaining Political Asylum: Classifying Rape
as a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution on Account of Political Opinion, 10 B.C.
THiRD WORLD L.J. 355, 358 (1990).
160 See id. at 380.
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Mulligan crafts a definition of "political opinion" that
permits political opinions imputed to the petitioner by others to
justify a grant of refugee status. She looks to Ninth and Fifth
Circuit opinions to show that the category has been construed
broadly. Specifically, she argues that case law.. establishes
that a victim of persecution need not be "politically active" to
suffer persecution on account of political opinion.'62
Yet, this view is contrary to the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of the political opinion category. In Elias-
Zacarias, the Court interpreted "political opinion" to mean that
one must afirmatively endorse a particular view to hold a
political opinion. 6 ' Imputed opinions are not considered,
although practically a court could interpret resistance or
noncompliance as a manifestation of opposition. The Court
affirmed the arbitrary distinction between politically motivated
harm and harm to overcome a petitioner's political opinion. The
distinction is arbitrary because in practice the results are the
same; the goal of the persecutor is to crush the manifestation
(or what he perceives to be a manifestation) of opposition by the
petitioner.
Although the Court's interpretation of the political opinion
category is inconsistent with Congressional goals and the
Protocol's definition of refugee,' it cannot be ignored.
Mulligan's version of "political opinion," although reasonable
given the broad interpretation intended by the UNHCR, cannot
survive Elias-Zacarias. Her note, published bef6re the Elias-
Zacarias decision, proposes no way to avoid that decision.
Mulligan also suggests that the BIA is insensitive to
women's claims. "The BIA fails to adequately recognize the
161 "The Hernandez-Ortiz [v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985)] court
stressed that a government does not persecute those who share in its
ideologies, and that 'it is irrelevant whether a victim actually possesses any of
these opinions as long as the government believes that he does.' Thus, the
determination of what is 'political' need not focus solely on the actions of the
applicant." Mulligan, supra note 159, at 365.
Mulligan also states that Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977),
"is evidence that the Fifth Circuit also has established precedent entitling
refugees to political asylum as the result of actions against them by their
government. The holding does not state, and actually denies, the need for
overt political action by the refugee." Mulligan, supra note 159, at 368-69.
16 2Mulligan, supra note 159, at 372.
1 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
1 See Fielden, supra note 47, at 974-77.
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humanitarian foundation underlying the Refugee Act of
1980.... There is severe discrimination among applicants,
many more applicants are accepted from communist countries,
and less so from countries whose governments are supported by
the United States."'65  Mulligan concludes that "[t]he
Immigration Judges and BIA as a group, are not objective
bodies of adjudication.' 16 6 Furthermore, "the INS does what it
can to discourage certain classes of people from applying for
asylum, and takes measures to see that particular nationals are
kept ignorant of asylum possibilities and availability of counsel
to help obtain those rights."'67
The fact that only certain acts have been historically
recognized as "political"'68 exacerbates judges' insensitivity to
women's claims. Most of the acts recognized as "political" take
place in the public sphere. This narrow definition of what is
"political" excludes many gender-specific claims of women,
which arise from acts that take place largely in the more private
spheres of home and neighborhood.'69  This reifies the
public/private distinction by creating an insular sphere within
which there is little or no governmental protection from possible
abuse.7 ' Given the practical application of the political opinion
category, women's claims of gender-specific persecution falling
solely within the two classifications articulated above' 71 will
165 Mulligan, supra note 159, at 374.
16 6 Id. at 376.
167 Id. at 375.
168 "Most asylum adjudicators have accepted as 'political' such activities
as membership in a political organization, or expression of a political opinion
through party membership, political demonstrations, and propaganda
distribution." Bevis, supra note 26, at 401-02.
... See supra text accompanying notes 141-151.
170 See, e.g., Michael D.A. Freeman, Violence Against Women: Does the
Legal System Provide Solutions or Itself Constitute the Problem?, 3 CAN. J.
FAM. L. 377 (1980); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITIcs OF LAW 151 (David Kairys
ed., 1990).
171 The first consists of women who fear persecution resulting from certain
circumstances of severe sexual discrimination on grounds of gender, either by
public authorities or at the hands of private citizens whose actions the state
is unwilling or unable to control. The second consists of women who fear
persecution for failing to conform to, or for transgressing, certain sex-
discriminating religious or customary laws and practices in their country of
origin. See supra p. 14.
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probably not be recognized as persecution on account of political
opinion.
2. Membership in a Social Group
Women fleeing sex-based persecution clearly share a
common background and social status for which they are
persecuted; thus, they fall well within the social group definition
as articulated in the UNHCR Handbook. 2 The UNHCR has
recommended that women fleeing sex-based persecution be
eligible for asylum under the social group classification and has
asserted that such claims are within the ambit of Article I of the
Refugee Convention. " - There is also increasing international
pressure to apply the particular social group 6lassification to the
claims of women who allege a fear of persecution solely because
of their gender.
Proponents argue that gender is an innate and immutable
characteristic that is beyond a person's power to change, and
therefore gender constitutes a distinguishable social group.
Enforced female genital mutilation constitutes persecution that
targets women as a particular group. The group's definition is
provided by the persecutor, not the persecuted group. Where
there is identifiable persecution of a particular group, such as
female genital mutilation, and the group's definition is provided
by the persecutor, the social group is distinctly defined.7 4
Although the Board of Immigration Appeals has previously
recognized sex as an immutable characteristic, 75 the Second
Circuit more recently held that gender possesses characteristics
that are too "broadly-based" to identify a particular social
172 Neal, supra note 62, at 230.
'
7 s Id. at 232; Statement by Canadian Cabinet Minister Bernard Valcourt
(Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy) (In
1985, the UNHCR passed resolution that women seeking asylum should be
considered part of the "particular social group" category.).
n4 See Neal, supra note 62, at 239.
The Board noted in an opinion that
[W]e interpret the phrase "persecution on account of membership in
a particular social group" to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color or kinship
ties ....
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
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group.- ' In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 177 the Ninth Circuit
explained that the phrase "particular social group" implies a
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by a common impulse or interest. The court
maintained that the existence of a voluntary associational
relationship, which imparts a common characteristic
fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete
social group, is of central concern.
178
The Sanchez-Trujillo "voluntary association" requirement
contradicts the BIA's "immutable characteristic" requirement.
The "voluntary association" requirement has also been criticized
as having no basis in the Convention. 7 9 However, neither the
BIA criteria nor the Ninth Circuit criteria define "social group"
for most courts. In fact, no United States court has yet defined
clear-cut and adequate criteria for determining social group
status. 8 ° While Sanchez-Trujillo proffers a solution to the
problem, its definition has not been adopted outside the Ninth
Circuit. Other circuits have remained silent on the issue or
have reached conclusions as to the cognizability of a particular
social group without revealing the criteria upon which the
conclusions are based.'1
8
Commentators including Karen Bower8 2 and Nancy Kelly
83
advocate interpretations of the "social group" category that
would encompass claims of gender-specific persecution. Like
Maureen Mulligan,"M they believe that it is possible to recognize
claims of gender-specific persecution under the current refugee
definition if one category were simply construed a little more
broadly by United States courts.
Bower recognizes all serious violations of human rights as
persecution. She argues that gender-based violations are
176 Gomez v. INS, 949 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
177 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
17 Id. at 1576; Kelly, supra note 63, at 52.
179 Kelly, supra note 63, at 53-54.
180 Parish, supra note 19, at 944.
181 Id.
182 Karen Bower, Note, Recognizing Violence Against Women as
Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a Particular Social Group, 7 GEO.
IMMIG. L.J. 173, 188-193 (1993).
183 Kelly, supra note 63.
18 Mulligan, supra note 159.
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human rights violations and therefore ought to constitute
persecution for purposes of the refugee definition.'85 Although
Bower's argument makes sense, the courts are unlikely to
broaden the refugee definition to include gender-based
violations. Ordinarily, the courts do not consider gender-based
violence - such as sexual assault, domestic violence, genital
mutilation, and coerced prostitution - as either human rights
violations or persecution under the current refugee definition. 88
Kelly, however, proposes reworking the "membership in a
social group" category."7 She also calls on "advocates and
adjudicators [to] re-evaluate the manner in which the claims of
women are investigated and presented to insure that these
claims become a more accurate reflection of women's reality." 88
Kelly's approach resembles Canada's approach which, under its
new guidelines for conduct of refugee hearings, provides advice
on how to deal with women who fear situations ranging from
spousal abuse to rape, including gender-specific persecution
such as female genital mutilation.8 9 However, as stated above,
these guidelines are non-binding. 9 '
In attempting to create a framework that will recognize
women's claims to refugee status on their own merit, the choice
of methodology is important. Methodology can either empower
women or simply reshuffle the status quo:
Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it
determines what counts as evidence and defines what
is taken as verification." Feminists cannot ignore
method, because if they seek to challenge existing
structures of power with the same methods that have
defined what counts within those structures, they may
instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that
they are] trying to identify and undermine."''
185 Bower, supra note 182, at 180-81.
, Id. at 181.
187 Kelly, supra note 63, at 105.
188 Id.
189 Kim Lunman, Safe at Last: Canada's New Refugee Guidelines Offer
Hope and Security for Battered Women from Other Countries, CALGARY
HERALD, July 4, 1993, at B1.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
K9 1 atharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
830-831 (1990).
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In spite of current efforts to rework the existing categories
of the refugee definition, courts will continue to fail to recognize
women's claims. Laws and their interpretations are consistently
seen through a male lens.'92 As long as the legal system
continues to be "objective" with regard to gender differences,
women's claims will continue to go unrecognized because "[t]he
male epistemological stance is objectivity, and sexual objectivity
is the 'primary process of the subjection of women. '193
The proposed approaches to recognizing women's refugee
claims rely on methods that place a great deal of discretion in
the hands of judges who are largely white, male, conservative,
and unelected. These approaches do not openly challenge the
biases against women inherent in the process of petitioning for
refugee status. As Kelly states:
[Blecause of the absence of the explicit recognition of
gender-based persecution, and because of the social and
political context in which the claims of women are
adjudicated, women are much less likely than men to
be found to meet the eligibility criteria for refugee
status. This problem is twofold. First, the definition of
refugee contained in the Convention does not
specifically name gender as one of the bases upon
which asylum can be granted. Second, in applying the
refugee definition, adjudicators have traditionally
neglected to incorporate the gender-specific claims of
women in the interpretation of the other grounds
recognized under the Convention.'94
Thus, merely incorporating gender-based violations into the
already existing categories is an insufficient approach to
removing the inherent biases women currently must overcome
in order to obtain refugee status.
IV. THE NEW CATEGORY - GENDER
The current categories of the refugee definition do not
accommodate gender-specific persecution. Nor does the existing
immigration adjudicatory structure see and understand the
192 Mulligan, supra note 159, at 377.
193 Id.
194 Kelly, supra note 63, at 4-5 (citations omitted).
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situation of women.'95 No cohesive framework exists within
which to evaluate gender-specific claims. United States law
could attempt to incorporate the claims -of women into the
Protocol's categories, but that would not recognize the fact that
the type of persecution women face is different from that of
men.'96 Nor would it compensate for the decidedly white, male
slant of the current definition, or the biases of the immigration
judges and the BIA, Thus, legislators must create a separate
category.
The addition of gender as a sixth category under the refugee
definition would be consistent with the evolutionary history of
United States immigration law and general humanitarian goals.
It would also recognize the unique problems that women face,
as opposed to trying to fit them into pre-existing categories that
do not consider women's needs and often work against them.
Only this additional category will allow women to receive
the full benefits of refugee law, as the current system fails to
recognize' gender-specific- oppression. It would clearly require
both judicial recognition of the claims of women fleeing gender-
specific persecution and careful consideration of such claims. It
would also obviate the necessity for judicial or administrative
intervention in cases where persecution is shown, but is not
based on one of the existing categories. Explicit recognition of
gender-specific oppression would ensure that claims to refugee
status accurately reflect women's reality by allowing them to
tell their story as opposed to attempting to tailor it to the
current categories. This new category would also be consistent
with humanitarian goals, such as assisting refugee women in
their.quest for freedom and dignity.
Some might argue that the addition of a category
specifically for women could present problems for the refugee
system overall. One possible argument against the inclusion of
an additional category in the refugee definition is that the
United States will be flooded with refugees. The recognition of
gender as a specific category may cause women to flock to the
United States in the belief that the country is a haven from all
forms of gender-specific oppression. Yet, even women in the
United States are not necessarily free from oppression." 7
195Muligan, supra note 159, at 376.
M See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
1 See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR
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Arguably, it is hypocritical of the United States to present itself
as a refuge for women fleeing gender-specific oppression, when
it has not dealt forcefully with such oppression within its own
borders.'98
Theoretically, refugee floods could be a problem, but on a
practical level, women often lack the financial resources to flee
their home countries. The addition of a refugee category will
not change that.'99 Also, arrival in the United States does not
guarantee refugee status. Even with the creation of a separate
category, women still must jump the procedural hurdles to
achieving refugee status."' This is one reason overall refugee
numbers are currently so small."'2 Also, refugee status is an
individual, not class, remedy, so the argument that there will be
too many refugees should not be dispositive of individual
claims.202
If a fair interpretation of the additional category produced
onerous results, it is within the province of Congress to act.
Limits in place from the early stages of the Refugee Act of
1980203 could be implemented if this situation arose.
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1992); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK
WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DIsCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw (1987).
198 For example, "although the American Medical Association is opposed
to the procedures [clitoridectomy and infibulation], they are legal in the United
States." Jacqueline Thorpe, Ontario Doctors Ban Female Circumcision,
Reuters, Jan. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File.
19 In the words of one Canadian refugee advocate, "[tihe notion that
women around the world are waiting with sneakers on to come to Canada is
ridiculous." David Scanlon, Abused Women: Pressure Rises to Admit Them as
Refugees, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 23, 1993, at A5.
200 The applicant still must prove that she meets the other elements of the
refugee definition. She must demonstrate that she has been persecuted in the
past or that she fears future persecution that her fear of future persecution is
well-founded, and that the feared persecution is by the government or by
someone who the government is unable or unwilling to control. See supra
Part I.
20 "[I]ndividuals who seek refugee status comprise probably the smallest
group of potential immigrants." Neal, supra note 62, at 243.
202 "By pegging the United States definition of refugee to that generated
by the United Nations in the Protocol and Convention, individual claims can
be and are to be entertained more fairly. Therefore, "slippery slope" or
"floodgate" arguments which are ultimately dispositive of individual claims are
incongruous with the concept and purpose of asylum." Id. at 203.
20 "In order to implement the Protocol's inclusive refugee definition
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Additionally, Congress would be at even greater liberty to
implement guidelines for the use of the sixth category, as it is
not currently part of the Protocol definition. Unlike the
categories currently in the Refugee Act, which are defined and
limited largely by the UN Convention and Protocol,2°4 the
United States would define the contours of the new category.
By adopting the new definition, the United States would take a
step beyond Canada's new guidelines 2°5 and take the lead in
offering refuge to victims of gender-specific persecution.
The promulgation of laws in the United States to aid those
who would choose to come to this country is not cultural
imperialism. This is not an act of forcing our views on another;
it is simply opening another path. We should provide these
women with an alternative to remaining in a country that forces
them into roles that they do not choose.
By conforming the United States refugee definition to the
Protocol, Congress agreed to cooperate with the TJNHCR.20 6 The
UN, through the UNHCR, recognized the specific dangers that
women face, and paved the way for member states to act by
passing a non-binding motion to include women in the category
of social group.2°' This action recognizes that gender-specific
persecution is an international refugee problem and that
interpretations of the current definition have not helped the
victims. Adding gender to the current refugee definition
comports with the spirit of the UN's motion, and would be the
next step in the evolution of United States refugee law. The
United States would be among the first to implement a
definition and attempt to create a cohesive framework, but it
would not be the first to recognize gender-specific persecution.0 8
without unacceptably expanding U.S. commitments, Congress coupled the new
expansive definition with an overall cap [of 50,000] on the number of refugees
to be admitted each year." Parish, supra note 19, at 935.
204 See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
206 Bevis, supra note 26, at 399.
217 Scanlon, supra note 199, at A5.
20 In 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling upon
states to accord refugee status within the "particular social group" category of
the refugee definition to women who suffer cruel and inhuman treatment
because they have violated the moral and ethical rules of their society. In
1985, the Executive Committee of the [UNHCR] considered a similar
resolution, ultimately adopting a conclusion which recognized:
that states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the
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The addition of "gender" as a refugee category is a moral and
political imperative. It is also a realistic goal, given increased
international recognition of the particular dangers women
refugees face.
[A] change is afoot. Even though many countries have
grown less tolerant of refugees in general, international
sympathy has grown for the traumas of women fleeing
persecution." 9
CONCLUSION
The current refugee framework does a disservice to women
fleeing gender-specific persecution. Women fleeing severe and
systemic discrimination who hope to gain refugee status must
fit their claims into a framework that is ill-suited to recognizing
gender-specific harms. Based on norms developed by the male-
dominated system of post-World War II Europe, the five current
categories of the United States refugee definition are
insufficient to address the exigent refugee situation.
For a member of the international community, sitting by
and allowing the systematic abuse of women to continue is
tantamount to aiding and abetting it.210 Such an abdication of
moral responsibility is anathema to everything that the United
States is supposed to represent. As a country valuing freedom
and individuality, the United States should not countenance
oppression simply because the victims are women.
As a nation that has historically responded to the needs of
the refugee population, the United States must take corrective
interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh and
inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a
'particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the
United Nations Refugee Convention.
Kelly, supra note 63, at 71-72 (citations omitted). Other countries have
granted asylum to Iranian women who refused to conform to gender-specific
dress codes and other limitations. Id. at 78.
209 Deborah Sontag, Asking for Asylum in U.S., Women Tread New
Territory, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 27, 1993, at Al, A13.
210 Cf No Target Too Young, TIME, Apr. 26, 1993, at 10 ('The West, by
not doing more, has been a little like an accomplice to a massacre.' - Margaret
Thatcher").
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measures: the definition of refugee must be expanded to include
gender. Recognizing gender as a refugee category would be
consistent with "the historic policy of the United States to
respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in
their homelands, ' 211 and would create a legally cognizable
ground for granting refugee status that is in line with domestic
law and its recognition of gender-specific oppression. Moreover,
it would place the United States at the forefront, of global
humanitarian efforts.
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door. 1
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